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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY FIRE FIGHTERS LOCAL 1645, AFL-CIO, FEDERATED FIRE
FIGHTERS OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE UNION LOCAL 470, AFL-CIO, SALT LAKE CITY
POLICE MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION,
SALT LAKE CITY EMPLOYEES, LOCAL
1004, AFL-CIO, for and on behalf of their
members, and JIM FISHER and DAVE
BRADFORD for themselves and for and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Case No.
11351

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed an action in the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County on behalf of themselves and
all employees of Salt Lake City similarly situated pursuant
to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking a declaratory judgment that
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(a) the words "any or all appo'intivP officers"
in Section 10-6-6 U. C. A. (1953) as amended by Laws
of Utah 1955, ch. 12, § 1, did not include all employees
of the city irrespective of their duties or the nature of
their employment, and
(b) that the Ordinances of the defendant Salt
Lake City of January 9, 1968, requiring "appointive
officers and employees" to reside within a "fifteen
mile radius from Washington Square" (R. 13) and
that portion of the city Ordinances, Sections 30-1-10,
14-1-5, 17-3-5 (R. 14) prohibiting any political activity
of any kind by health, fire or police employees, were
void as being unconstitutional and beyond the powers
of Respondent.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court, Judge Wilkins, without expressly
ruling on any of the issues before the Court, entered an
Order dated July 10, 1968, dismissing plaintiffs' Amended
Complain as failing "to state a cause of action" (R. 17-18).
Plaintiffs are appealing herein from said final Order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This Appeal seeks to have this Court grant the declaratoy relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants and which was
avoided and denied by the District Court, and reverse the
judgment of the District Court for errors of law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City adopted an Ordinance in early January, 1968,
(f:. 13) requiring all of its employees to remove their residences within "a 15 mile radius of Washington Square"
within two years or face discharge. Many employees reside
outside of the designated area in so-called "bedroom communities" abutting the irregular boundaries of the City
(Exhibits 1 and 5). The City is served by a new and extensive system of freeways running through the City and
adjacent areas where these employees reside (Map, Exhibit 1).
The City some years ago adopted three Ordinances (R.
14) prohibiting certain political activities by all employees
of the health, fire and police departments of the City. The
City interprets and enforces these Ordinances as prohibiting any political participation of any kind, even in nonpartisan elections, by these employees (R. 32; Exhibit 4).
These Ordinances affect a large number of City employees
(Exhibit 5).
No evidence or argument was advanced by the City
presenting, nor do the ordinances themselves present, any
reason, advantage, rationale or purpose for the Ordinances.
Thus, in the contert of the uncontroverted eviJence presented by plaintiffs, the Ordinances must be interpreted
as self-justifying.
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POINT I.
THE ORDINANCE RESPECTING THE RESIDENCE OF EMPLOYEES EXCEEDS THE
STATUTORY POWERS OF RESPONDENT.
The subject ordinance (R. 13) in substance and effect
requires all employees to remove their residence within a
"15 mile radius of Washington Square'' within 2 years or
face discharge. Respondent admits that "many employees
of defendant have been employed for numerous years and
reside outside the boundaries of defendant" (R. 16). The
ordinance includes all employees - whether police officer,
groundskeeper, janitor. The ordinance itself sets forth
no purpose, rationale or need.
This Court has on a number of occasions enunciated
the rule of limited powers of municipal corporations. This
Court held, in Stephenson vs. S. L. City Corporation, 7
Utah 2d 28, 30, 317 P. 2d 597, 599 (195'1) :
"That the powers of the city are strictly limited
to those expressly granted, to those necessarily or
fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted, and to those essential to the declared ob·
jects and purposes of the corporation, is settled law
in this state."
The Respondent offered no evidence or, indeed, any
argument, justifying any need, real or imagined, for or
any benefit to the City from, the subject ordinance. Two
of the plaintiffs, men of long and distinguished service to
Respondent in a variety of capacities, knew of no reason
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or need for these ordinances ( R. 26-39) . The evidence adduced - the addresses of the employees, the fact that many
reside outside Salt Lake City and outside the 15 mile radius,
the location of the freeway system in and adjacent to the
city, the addresses where these employees work (Exhibits
1, 2, 3 and 5) - establishes clearly that the ordinance \\as
nobhing but a wholly arbitrary exercise of raw power by
the City. The hardship to these employees - without any
reason, need or benefit to the City - is also obvious.
Respondent evidently claims to derive statutory power
to adopt the subject residence ordinance from Section
10-6-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That Statute reads:
"Eligibility of officers - All elective officers
of cities and of towns shall be chosen by the qualified voters of their respective municipalities. No
persons shall be eligible to any elective office who
is not a qualified elector of the city or town, nor
shall any person be eligible to any off ice who is a
defaulter to thee orporation. The governing body of
a mun:icipality may prescribe by ordinance thait any
or all appoinfrve officers be qualified eleetors of the
municipality." (Emphasis added.)
The Stephenson case, cited supra, is also helpful in its
holding that
"* * * It is a common rule of construction
that wherever possible each word in a statute must
be given a meaning, and 'that construction is favored which will render every word operative,
rather than one which makes some words idle and
nugatory.' (Citing)" 7 Utah 2d 28, 31.
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Had the legislature meant to give Respondent the
power to require that every employee of the city reside
within the city, the legislature could have and presumably
would have, used the simple word "employees" instead of
the restrictive words "appointive officers." The ordinance
itself completely bears out this distinction: the ordinancf'
by its language covers "every appointive officer and employee." Clearly both the legislature and Respondent by
employing the word "appointive officer" meant something different and, obviously, more restrictive than "employee." The fact that Section 10-6-6 is part of Article 1
entitled "Governing Bodies" of the Municipal Government
Code lends further support to Appellants' position that the
Respondent's equating "appointive officers" with "all employees" cannot be supported.
Furthermore, even according Section 16-6-6 U. C. A.,
1953, as amended, the construction argued for by Respondent, that statute certainly does not empower Respondent
to require that all employees reside within 15 miles of a
particular point (Washington Square) within the city. As
the city map (Exhibit 1) clearly shows, the 15 mile radius
embraces a fair sized area outside Salt Lake City.

POINT II.
THE ORDINANCES PROHIBITING ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES EXCEED THE STATUTORY POWERS OF RESPONDENT.
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The subject ordinances relating separately to employees of the health, fire and police departments are identical
in all respeots except as to the department covered (R. 14).
The ordinances read (the italicized portion is the only prohibition challenged by Appellants) :
"Sec. 30-1-10. Political activity. No person of the
classified civil service of the health lor fire or
police] department shall use his official position or
of any person, nor be a member or delegate or alternate to any political convention, nor serve as a
member of any committee of any political party, or
take any active part in the management of any political campaign, nor solicit, collect, or receive any
assessment, subscription, contribution or dues intended or used for any political purpose whatsoever."
Although the challenged portion of the subject ordinances prohibits only certain specified political activilties, Respondent construes and enforces the ordinances as meaning
that "there can be no politioal activity" and "no action in
a political sense" ( R. 32, lines 8-15) and as applicable to
non-partisan elections as well (Par. 6, Exhibit 4).
Here, too, neither the ordinances themselves suggest
nor did Respondent at the time of hearing herein offer,
any reason, need, rationale or benefit necessitating, justifying or even supporting these ordinances and two longtime employees of Respondent. plaintiffs herein, ·testified
that they knew of none (R. 26-39). Far from establishing
any "compelling public interest" (as required by the California Supreme Court in the Bagley case, cited and quoted
infra) or as having a "reasonable relation to the promo-
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tion of efficiency, integrity or discipline" within u
affected departments (as required by the New JerS€y ~,
preme Court in the De Stefano case cited and quoted infra
the Respondent herein made no showing of any kind sur
poding these ordinances. Nor are any of the constitution,
standards laid down by the United States Supreme Cour
in the Keyishian case, infra, met by the subject ord1:
ances.
POINT III.
THE ORDINANCES OF RESPONDENT R&
SPECTING THE RESIDENCE OF EMPLOYEES AND PROHIBITING ANY POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES BY EMPLOYEES ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiffs hav,e set out in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 anu
13 of their Amended Complaint (R. 5) what they believ1
to be certain basic, fundamental, inalienable human righ~
with which they are by their creaitor endowed and whicr
are expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of the Stati
of Utah, and which are, appellants submit, violated by the
subject ordinances. Among these provisions are Section:
1, 7 ' 18, 22 and 24 of Article I of the Constitution of th1
State of Utah.

Certain of the employees of the City reside outside oi
the City limits and others, outside of the arbitrary 15 milt
radius (Map, Exhibit 1). The residence ordinance makei
no provision for compensation if these modestly salariel
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employees lose their equity in their homes in removing inside the specified area. The ordinance was adopted after
these employees had established residence. The testimony
of Officel' Bradford (R. 33-37) illustrates something of the
ininstice, inequity, and hardships involved.
The map of the City and County (Exhibit 1) and the

location of the freeway system illustrates clearly that the
ordinance has no relationship at all to the time involved in
the employee's getting to work; in faot, the map makes
obvious intrusions on basis constitutional rights might, in
example, might well be able to reach "Washington Square"
in far Jess time than an employee living in, say, Holladay,
and within the 15 mile radius, could reach the same destination.
Perhaps one could postulate a situation where such
obvious intrusions on basis constitutional rights might, in
balancing critical, imperative needs of the cilty against
those of the employees, justify the subject ordinances. In
arrogance of power, the City makes no attempt to claim
or show any benefit to the city from this Ordinance; rnther
the ordinance is simply promulgated ex cathedra.
In United States vs. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315-316, 90
L. Ed. 1252, 1259-1260 ( 1946), laws denying a livelihood
are held to be included within the proscriptions of ex post
faC'to laws and bills of a;ttainder, and the constitutional
requisites of laws impinging rights of public employees are
spelled out definitively in Keyi.c;hia.n vs. Bd. of Regents of
University of New York, 385 U. S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17
L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967). See also, Landes vs. Town of North
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Hempstead, 36 U. S. Law Week 2313 (N. Y. Ct. of App,
1967), and Vogel vs. County of Los Angeles, 64 Cal. Rep.

-109 (Dec., 1967).

POINT IV.
THE ORDINANCES OF RESPONDENT RESPECTING THE RESIDENCE OF EMPLOYEES AND PROHIBITING ANY POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES BY EMPLOYEES ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES.
The California Supreme Court in the landmark case
of Bagley vs. Washington Hospital District, 421 P. 2d 409
(1966), well staJted the problem (at page 417) :
"In summary we note that the expansion of
government enterprise with its ever-increasing
number of employees marks this area of the law
a crucial one. As the number of persons employed
by government and governmentally-assisted institutions continues to grow the necessity of preserving
for them the maximum practicable right to partici·
pate in the political life of the republic grows with
it. Restrictions on public employees which, in some
or all of their applications, advance no compelling
public interest commensurate with the waiver of
constitutional rights which they require, imperil the
continued op~ration of our institutions of represen·
tative government. * * *"
And at page 414:

"* * * Just as we have rejected the fallac·
ious argument that the power of government to
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impose such conditions knows no limits, so must we
acknowledge that government may, when circumstances inexorably so require, impose conjitions
upon the enjoyment of publicly-conferred benefits
despite a resulting qualification of rights.
"In doing so, however, go'uernment bears a
heavy burden of demonstrating the practical necessity for the limitation. At the very least it must
establish that the imposed conditions relate to the
purposes of the legislation which confers the benefit
or privilege * * *" (Emphasis added.)
Appellants submit that the Bagley case i~ sound, basic,
critical contemporary law. Basically, Bagley's thrust is
that "only a 'compelling' public interest can justify the imposition of restraints upon the political activities of public
employees * * *" (421 P. 2d 409, 411) and the Court
gives, Appellants submit, irrefutable argument in support
of that thesis. Rather than attempt summary or precis
of Bagley or burden this brief with extensive quotations
from the opinion, Appellants respectfully urge this Court
to examine the entire opinion and the exhaustive citations
therein.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the 1967 case of
De Stefano vs. Wilson, 233 A. 2d 682 in striking down a
regulation very similar to that at bar and where the plaintiff was a fireman (as are certain of the appellants herein)
cited and quoted Bagley with approval and observed (ait
687):

"Rule 128 exacts a surrender of frieedoms unrelated to the public welfare or common weal. It
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bears no reasonable relation to the promotion ot
efficiency, integrity or discipline within the Ho.
boken Fire Department."
The United States Supreme Court in Keyishian vs.
Bd. of Regents of University of N. Y., supra, ( 1967), hela
(at 17 L. Ed. 2d 642) :

"* * '" the theory that public employment
which may be denied altogether may be subjected
to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable,
has been uniformly rejected (citing)."
CONCLUSION
This is an era when our courts seem most Jedicated
to protection and expansion of the constitutional rights of
persons accused of crime - and rightly so. Cerrtainly,
however, our courts should be at least equally concerned
with the constitutional rights of our fine, dedicated, lawabiding citizens who are employed by government. The
Cirty simply had no right and no reason to adopt these ordinances and the resultant hardship to its employ€es is
apparent.
Appellants are not, as the City will argue, asking this
Court to either second guess the City Commission or substitute the collective wisdom of this Court for that of the
Commissioners. Appellants argue that fundamental human
rights must be protected and when elected governmental
officials choose to run roughshod over the rights of gov·
ernment employees - and as the California Supreme Court
observed, their number, for good or ill, is large and on the
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increase - this Court must give the Constitution of our
State and the Constitution of our nation, meaningful application.
If our constitutional guarantees are to mean anything

at all to law-abiding citizens, they must mean that the City
cannot - without any justification at all - adopt these
ordinances which so flagrantly abridge the most basic
hllman rights and dignity.
In the interest of justice and preservation of basic
human rights, these ordinances should be struck down by
this Court.
Respectfully submitted,

ADAM M. DUNCAN
319 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Umh
Attorney for
Plaintifls-Appellants

